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Abstract
While the interpretability of machine learning models is often equated with
their mere syntactic comprehensibility, we think that interpretability goes be-
yond that, and that human interpretability should also be investigated from
the point of view of cognitive science. In particular, the goal of this paper is
to discuss to what extent cognitive biases may affect human understanding of
interpretable machine learning models, in particular of logical rules discovered
from data. Twenty cognitive biases are covered, as are possible debiasing tech-
niques that can be adopted by designers of machine learning algorithms and
software. Our review transfers results obtained in cognitive psychology to the
domain of machine learning, aiming to bridge the current gap between these
two areas. It needs to be followed by empirical studies specifically focused on
the machine learning domain.
Keywords: cognitive bias, cognitive illusion, machine learning,
interpretability, rule induction
1. Introduction
This paper aims to investigate the possible effects of cognitive biases on hu-
man understanding of machine learning models, in particular inductively learned
rules. We use the term “cognitive bias” as a representative for various cognitive
phenomena that materialize themselves in the form of occasionally irrational rea-
soning patterns, which are thought to allow humans to make fast judgments and
decisions. Their cumulative effect on human reasoning should not be underesti-
mated as “cognitive biases seem reliable, systematic, and difficult to eliminate”
[79]. The effect of some cognitive biases is more pronounced when people do
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not have well-articulated preferences [154], which is often the case in explorative
machine learning.
Previous works have analysed the impact of cognitive biases on multiple
types of human behavior and decision making. A specific example is the semi-
nal book “Social cognition” by Kunda [85], which is concerned with the impact
of cognitive biases on social interaction. Another, more recent work by Serfas
[133] focused on the context of capital investment. Closer to the domain of ma-
chine learning, in their article entitled “Psychology of Prediction”, Kahneman
and Tversky [80] warned that cognitive biases can lead to violations of the Bayes
theorem when people make fact-based predictions under uncertainty. These re-
sults directly relate to inductively learned rules, since these are associated with
measures such as confidence and support expressing the (un)certainty of the
prediction they make. Despite some early works [99, 100] showing the impor-
tance of study of cognitive phenomena for rule induction and machine learning
in general, there has been a paucity of follow-up research. In previous work [51],
we have evaluated a selection of cognitive biases in the very specific context of
whether minimizing the complexity or length of a rule will also lead to increased
interpretability, which is often taken for granted in machine learning research.
In this paper, we attempt to systematically relate cognitive biases to the
interpretation of machine learning results. To that end, we review twenty cog-
nitive biases that can distort interpretation of inductively learned rules. The
review is intended to help to answer questions such as: How do cognitive biases
affect human understanding of symbolic machine learning models? What could
help as a “debiasing antidote”?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of related
work published at the intersection of rule learning and psychology. Section 3
motivates our study on the example of the insensitivity to sample size effect.
Section 4 describes the criteria that we applied to select a subset of cognitive
biases into our review, which eventually resulted in twenty biases. These biases
and their disparate effects and causes are covered in detail in Section 5. Section 6
provides a concise set of recommendations aimed at developers of rule learning
algorithms and user interfaces. In Section 7 we state the limitations of our
review and outline directions for future work. The conclusions summarize the
contributions of the paper.
2. Background and Related Work
We selected individual rules as learnt by many machine learning algorithms
as the object of our study. Focusing on simple artefacts—individual rules—
as opposed to entire models such as rule sets or rule lists allows a deeper,
more focused analysis since a rule is a small self-contained item of knowledge.
Making a small change in one rule, such as adding a new condition, allows to
test the effect of an individual factor. In this section, we first motivate our
work by putting it into the context of prior research on related topics. Then,
we proceed by a brief introduction to inductive rule learning (Section 2.2) and
a brief recapitulation of previous work in cognitive science on the subject of
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decision rules (Section 2.3). Finally, we introduce cognitive biases (Section 2.4)
and and rule plausibility (Section 2.5, which is a measure of rule comprehension.
2.1. Motivation
In the following three paragraphs, we discuss our motivation for this re-
view, and summarize why we think this work is relevant to the larger artificial
intelligence community.
Explaining “black box” models with rules. While neural networks and ensembles
of decision trees are increasingly becoming the prevalent type of representation
used in machine learning, it might be at first surprising that our review focuses
almost exclusively on decision rules. The reason is that rules are widely used
as a means for communicating explanations of a variety of machine learning
approaches, since many types of models can be converted to rules, or rules can
be extracted from them [5]. Decision trees can be represented as a rule model,
when one rule is generated for each path from the root of the tree to a leaf.
Guidotti et al. [66] provides a review of research on using rules for explaining
some “black-box models”, including neural networks, support vector machines
and tree ensembles.
Embedding cognitive biases to learning algorithms. The applications of cogni-
tive biases go beyond explaining existing machine learning models. For example,
Taniguchi et al. [145] demonstrate how a cognitive bias can be embedded into a
machine learning algorithm, achieving superior performance on small datasets
compared to commonly used machine learning algorithms with “generic” induc-
tive bias.
Paucity of research on cognitive biases in artificial intelligence. Several recent
position and review papers on explainability in Artificial Intelligence (xAI) rec-
ognize that cognitive biases play an important role in explainability research
[101, 117]. To our knowledge, the only systematic treatment of psychological
phenomena applicable to machine learning is provided by the review of Miller
[101], which focuses on reasons and thought processes that people apply during
explanation selection, such as causality, abnormality and the use of counterfac-
tuals. This authoritative review observes that there are currently no studies that
look at cognitive biases in the context of selecting explanations. Because of the
paucity of applicable research focusing on machine learning, the review of Miller
[101] — same as the present paper — takes the first step of applying influential
psychological studies to explanation in the xAI context without accompanying
experimental validation specific to machine learning. While Miller [101] sum-
marizes main reasoning processes that drive generation and understanding of
explanations, our review focuses specifically on cognitive biases as psychological
phenomena that can distort interpretation of machine learning models, if not
properly accounted for.
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IF A AND B THEN C
confidence=c and support=s
IF veil is white AND odor is foul THEN mushroom is poisonous
confidence = 90%, support = 5%
Figure 1: Inductively learned rule
2.2. Decision Rules in Machine Learning
While neural networks and ensembles of decision trees are increasingly be-
coming the prevalent type of representation used in machine learning, our review
focuses almost solely on decision rules because many types of models can be
converted to rules, or rules can be extracted from them, and rules are therefore
widely used as a means for communicating explanations of a variety of machine
learning approaches.
An example of an inductively learned decision rule, which is a subject of the
presented review, is shown in Figure 1. Following the terminology of Fu¨rnkranz
et al. [50], A,B,C represent literals, i.e., Boolean expressions which are com-
posed of attribute name (e.g., veil) and its value (e.g., white). The conjunction
of literals on the left side of the rule is called antecedent or rule body, the sin-
gle literal predicted by the rule is called consequent or rule head. Literals in
the body are sometimes referred to as conditions throughout the text, and the
consequent as the target. While this rule definition is restricted to conjunctive
rules, other definitions, e.g., the formal definition given by Slowinski et al. [138],
also allow for negation and disjunction as connectives.
Rules on the output of rule learning algorithms are most commonly charac-
terized by two parameters, confidence and support. The confidence of a rule—
sometimes also referred to as precision—is defined as a/(a + b), where a is
the number objects that match both the conditions of the rule as well as the
consequent, and b is the number of objects that match the antecedent but not
the consequent. The support of a rule is either defined as a/N , where N is the
number of all objects (relative support), or simply as a (absolute support). A
related measure is coverage, which is the total number of objects that satisfy
the body of the rule (a+ b). In the special case of learning rules for the purpose
of building a classifier, the consequent of a rule consists only of a single literal,
the so-called class. In this case, a is also known as the number of true positives,
and b as the false positives.
Some rule learning frameworks, in particular association rule learning [1,
171], require the user to set thresholds for minimum confidence and support.
Only rules with confidence and support values meeting or exceeding these thresh-
olds are included on the output of rule learning and presented to the user.
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2.3. Decision Rules in Cognitive Science
Rules are used in commonly embraced models of human reasoning in cogni-
tive science [139, 112, 120]. They also closely relate to Bayesian inference, which
also frequently occurs in models of human reasoning. Consider the first rule of
Figure 1. This rule can be interpreted as a hypothesis corresponding to the logi-
cal implication A∧B ⇒ C. We can express the plausibility of such a hypothesis
in terms of Bayesian inference as the conditional probability Pr(C|A,B). This
corresponds to the confidence of the rule, as used in machine learning and as
defined above, and to strength of evidence, a term used by cognitive scientists
[151].
Given that Pr(C|A,B) is a probability estimate computed on a sample,
another relevant piece of information for determining the plausibility of the
hypothesis is the robustness of this estimate. This corresponds to the number of
instances for which the rule has been observed to be true. The size of the sample
(typically expressed as ratio) is known as rule support in machine learning and
as weight of the evidence in cognitive science [151].1
Psychological research on hypothesis testing in rule discovery tasks has been
performed in cognitive science at least since the 1960s. The seminal article
by Wason [161] introduced what is widely referred to as Wason’s 2-4-6 task.
Participants are given the sequence of numbers 2, 4 and 6 and asked to find
out the rule that generated this sequence. In search for the hypothesized rule
they provide the experimenter other sequences of numbers, such as 3-5-7, and
the experimenter answers whether the provided sequence conforms to the rule,
or not. While the target rule is simple “ascending sequence”, people find it
difficult to discover this specific rule, presumably because they use the positive
test strategy, a strategy of testing a hypothesis by examining evidence confirming
the hypothesis at hand rather then searching for disconfirming evidence [82].
2.4. Cognitive Bias
According to the Encyclopedia of Human Behavior [164], the term cognitive
bias was introduced in the 1970s by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman [151],
and is defined as a
”systematic error in judgment and decision-making common to all
human beings which can be due to cognitive limitations, motiva-
tional factors, and/or adaptations to natural environments.”
The narrow initial definition of cognitive bias as a shortcoming of human
judgment was criticized by German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer, who started
in the late 1990s the “Fast and frugal heuristic” program to emphasize ecological
rationality (validity) of judgmental heuristics [61]. According to this research
1 Interestingly, balancing the likelihood of the judgment and the weight of the evidence in
the assessed likelihood was already studied by Keynes [81] (according to Camerer and Weber
[22]).
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program, cognitive biases often result from an application of a heuristic in an
environment for which it is not suited rather than from problems with heuristics
themselves, which work well in usual contexts.
In the present view, we define cognitive biases and associated phenomena
broadly. We include cognitive biases related to thinking, judgment, and mem-
ory. We also include descriptions of thinking strategies and judgmental heuris-
tics that may result in cognitive biases, even if they are not necessarily biases
themselves.
Debiasing. An important aspect related to the study of cognitive biases is the
validation of strategies for mitigating their effects in cases when they lead to
incorrect judgment. A number of such debiasing techniques has been developed,
with researchers focusing intensely on the clinical and judicial domains (cf. e.g.
[89, 27, 95]), apparently due to costs associated with erroneous judgment in
these domains. Nevertheless, general debiasing techniques can often be derived
from such studies.
The choice of an appropriate debiasing technique typically depends on the
type of error induced by the bias, since this implies an appropriate debiasing
strategy [6]. Larrick [88] recognizes the following three categories: psychophysically-
based error, association-based error, and strategy-based error. The first two are
attributable to unconscious, automatic processes, sometimes referred to as ”Sys-
tem 1”. The last one is attributed to reasoning processes (System 2) [36]. For
biases attributable to System 1, the most generic debiasing strategy is to shift
processing to the conscious System 2 [92], [134, p. 491].
Another perspective on debiasing is provided by Croskerry et al. [27], who
organize debiasing techniques by their way of functioning, rather than the bias
they address, into the following three categories: educational strategies, work-
place strategies and forcing functions. While Croskerry et al. [27] focused on
clinicians, our review of debiasing aims to be used as a starting point for analo-
gous guidelines for an audience of machine learning practitioners. For example,
the general workplace strategies applicable in the machine learning context in-
clude group decision making, personal accountability, and planning time-out
sessions to help slowing down.
Function and validity of cognitive biases. In the introduction, we briefly char-
acterized cognitive biases as seemingly irrational reasoning patterns that are
thought to allow humans to make fast and risk-averse decisions. In fact, the
function of cognitive biases is subject of scientific debate. According to the
review of functional views by Pohl [122], there are three fundamental positions
among researchers. The first group considers them as dysfunctional errors of the
system, the second group as faulty by-products of otherwise functional processes,
and the third group as adaptive and thus functional responses. According to
Pohl [122], most researchers are in the second group, where cognitive biases are
considered to be “built-in errors of the human information-processing systems”.
In this work, we consider cognitive biases as strategies that evolved to im-
prove the fitness and chances of survival of the individual in particular situations
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or are consequences of such strategies. This defense of biases is succinctly ex-
pressed by Haselton and Nettle [68]: “Both the content and direction of biases
can be predicted theoretically and explained by optimality when viewed through
the long lens of evolutionary theory. Thus, the human mind shows good design,
although it is design for fitness maximization, not truth preservation.”
According to the same paper, empirical evidence shows that cognitive biases
are triggered or strengthened by environmental cues and context [68]. Given
that the interpretation of machine learning results is a task unlike the simple
automatic cognitive processes to which a human mind is adapted, cognitive
biases are likely to have an influence upon it.
2.5. Measures of Interpretability, Perceived and Objective Plausibility
We claim that cognitive biases can affect the interpretation of rule-based
models. However, how does one measure interpretability? According to our
literature review, there is no generally accepted measure of interpretability of
machine learning models. Model size, which was used in several studies, has
recently been criticized [46, 142, 51] primarily on the grounds that the model’s
syntactic size does not capture any aspect of the model’s semantics. A particular
problem related to semantics is the compliance to pre-existing expert knowledge,
such as domain-specific monotonicity constraints.
In our work, we embrace the concept of plausibility to measure interpretabil-
ity [52]. The word ’plausible’ is defined according to the Oxford Dictionary of US
English as “seeming reasonable or probable” and according to the Cambridge
dictionary of UK English as “seeming likely to be true, or able to be believed”.
We can link the inductively learned rule to the concept of “hypothesis” used in
cognitive science. There is a body of work in cognitive science on analyzing the
perceived plausibility of hypotheses [57, 58, 4].
In a recent review of interpretability definitions by Bibal and Fre´nay [17],
the term plausibility is not explicitly covered, but a closely related concept of
justifiability is stated to depend on interpretability. Martens et al. [94] define
justifiability as “intuitively correct and in accordance with domain knowledge”.
By adopting plausibility, we address the concern expressed in Freitas [46] re-
garding the need to reflect domain semantics when interpretability is measured.
We are aware of the fact that if a decision maker finds a rule plausible, it
does not necessarily mean that the rule is correctly understood, it can be quite
the contrary in many cases. Nevertheless, we believe that the alignment of
the perceived plausibility with objective, data-driven, plausibility of a hypothesis
should be at the heart of an effort that strives for interpretable machine learning.
3. Motivational Example
It is well known in machine learning that chance rules with a deceptively
high confidence can appear in the output of rule learning algorithms [8]. For
this reason, the rule learning process typically outputs both confidence and
support for the analyst to make an informed choice about merits of each rule.
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Example.
• IF a film is released in 2006 AND the language of the
film is English THEN Rating is good,
confidence = 80%, support = 10%.
• IF a film is released in 2006 AND the director was John
Smith THEN Rating is good,
confidence = 90%, support = 1%.
In the example above, both rules are associated with values of confidence and
support to inform about the strength and weight of evidence for both rules.
While the first rule is less strong (80% vs 90% correct), its weight of the evidence
is ten times higher than of the second rule.
According to the insensitivity to sample size effect [151] there is a systematic
bias in human thinking that makes humans overweigh the strength of evidence
(confidence) and underweigh the weight of evidence (support). The bias has
been also shown in psychologists knowledgable in statistics [149] and thus is
likely to be applicable to the widening number of professions that use rule
learning to obtain insights from data.
The analysis of relevant literature from cognitive science not only reveals
applicable biases, but also sometimes provides methods for limiting their effect
(debiasing). The standard way used in rule learning software for displaying rule
confidence and support metrics is to use percentages, as in our example. Exten-
sive research in psychology has shown that if frequencies are used instead, then
the number of errors in judgment drops [60, 62]. Reflecting these suggestions,
the first rule in our example could be presented as follows:
Example.
• IF a film is released in 2006 AND the language of the
film is English THEN Rating is good.
In our data, there are 100 movies which match the
conditions of this rule. Out of these, 80 are predicted
correctly as having good rating.
Rules can be presented in different ways (as shown), and depending on the way
the information is presented, humans may perceive their plausibility differently.
In this particular example, confidence is no longer conveyed as a percentage
”80%” but using expression ”80 out of 100”. Support is presented as an absolute
number (100) rather than as a percentage (10%).
A correct understanding of machine learning models can be difficult even for
experts. In this section, we tried to motivate why addressing cognitive biases
can play an important role in making the results of inductive rule learning more
understandable. In the remainder of this paper, the bias applied to our example
will be revisited in greater depth, along with 19 other biases.
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4. Selection Criteria
A number of cognitive biases have been discovered, experimentally studied,
and extensively described in the literature. As Pohl [122] states in a recent
authoritative book on cognitive illusions: “There is a plethora of phenomena
showing that we deviate in our thinking, judgment and memory from some
objective and arguably correct standard.”
We first selected a subset of biases which would be reviewed. To select ap-
plicable biases, we considered those that have some relation to the following
properties of inductively learned rules: 1. rule length (the number of literals in
an antecedent), 2. rule interest measures (especially support and confidence),
3. position (ordering) of conditions in a rule and ordering of rules in the rule
list, 4. specificity and predictive power of conditions (correlation with a tar-
get variable), 5. use of additional logical connectives (conjunction, disjunction,
negation), 6. treatment of missing information (inclusion of conditions referring
to missing values), and 7. conflict between rules in the rule list.
Through selection of appropriate learning heuristics, the rule learning algo-
rithm can influence these properties. For example, most heuristics implement
some form of a trade-off between the coverage or support of a rule, and its
implication strength or confidence [49, 50].
5. Review of Cognitive Biases
In this section, we cover a selection of twenty cognitive biases. For all of
them, we include a short description including an example of a study demon-
strating the bias and its proposed explanation. We pay particular attention to
their potential effect on the interpretability of rule learning results, which has
not been covered in previous works. For all cognitive biases we also suggest a
debiasing technique that could be effective in aligning the perceived plausibility
of the rule with its objective plausibility.
In a recent scientometric survey of research on cognitive biases in information
systems [44], no papers are mentioned that aim at machine learning. For general
information systems research, the authors claim that “most articles’ research
goal [is] to provide an explanation of the cognitive bias phenomenon rather than
to develop ways and strategies for its avoidance or targeted use”. In contrast,
our review aims at advancement of the field beyond explanation of applicable
phenomena, by discussing specific debiasing techniques.
An overview of the main features of the reviewed cognitive biases is presented
in Table 1. Note that the debiasing techniques that we describe have only limited
grounding in applied psychological research and require further validation, since
as Lilienfeld et al. [92] observe, there is a general paucity of research on debiasing
in psychological literature, and the existing techniques suffer from a lack of
theoretical coherence and a mixed research evidence concerning their efficacy.
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phenomenon implications for rule-learning debiasing technique
Representativeness Heuristic Overestimate the probability of condition representative of
consequent
Use natural frequencies instead of ratios or probabilities
Averaging Heuristic Probability of antecedent as the average of probabilities of
conditions
Reminder of probability theory
Disjunction Fallacy Prefer more specific conditions over less specific Inform on taxonomical relation between conditions; explain
benefits of higher support
Base-rate Neglect Emphasis on confidence, neglect for support Express confidence and support in natural frequencies
Insensitivity to Sample Size Analyst does not realize the increased reliability of confidence
estimate with increasing value of support
Present support as absolute number rather than percentage;
use support to compute confidence (reliability) intervals for
the value of confidence
Availability Heuristic Ease of recollection of instances matching the rule Explain to analyst why instances matching the particular rule
are (not) easily recalled
Reiteration Effect Presentation of redundant rules or conditions increases plau-
sibility
rule pruning; clustering; explaining overlap
Confirmation Bias Rules confirming analyst’s prior hypothesis are “cherry
picked”
Explicit guidance to consider evidence for and against hypoth-
esis; education about the bias; interfaces making users slow
down
Mere Exposure Effect Repeated exposure (even subconscious) results in increased
preference
Changes to user interfaces that limit subliminal presentation
of rules
Overconfidence and undercon-
fidence
Rules with small support and high confidence are “overrated” Present less information when not relevant via pruning, fea-
ture selection, limiting rule length; actively present conflicting
rules/knowledge.
Recognition Heuristic Recognition of attribute or its value increases preference More time; knowledge of attribute/value
Information Bias belief that more information (rules, conditions) will improve
decision making even if it is irrelevant
Communicate attribute importance
Ambiguity Aversion Prefer rules without unknown conditions Increase user motivation; instruct users to provide textual jus-
tifications
Confusion of the Inverse Confusing the difference between the confidence of the rule
Pr(consequent|antecedent) with Pr(antecedent|consequent)
Training in probability theory; unambiguous wording
Misunderstanding of “and” “and” is understood as disjunction Unambiguous wording; visual representation
Context and Tradeoff Contrast Preference for a rule is influenced by other rules Removal of rules, especially of those that are strong, yet irrel-
evant
Negativity Bias Words with negative valence in the rule make it appear more
important
Review words with negative valence in data, and possibly re-
place with neutral alternatives
Primacy Effect Information presented first has the highest impact Education on the bias; resorting; rule annotation
Weak Evidence Effect Condition only weakly perceived as predictive of target de-
creases plausibility
Numerical expression of strength of evidence; omission of weak
predictors (conditions)
Unit Bias Conditions are perceived to have same importance Inform on discriminatory power of conditions
Table 1: Summary of analysis of cognitive biases.
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5.1. Conjunction Fallacy and Representativeness Heuristic
The conjunction fallacy refers to a judgment that is inconsistent with the
conjunction rule – the probability of a conjunction, Pr(A,B), cannot exceed
the probability of its constituents, Pr(A) and Pr(B). It is often illustrated with
the “Linda” problem in the literature [153]. In the Linda problem, depicted in
Figure 2, subjects are asked to compare conditional probabilities Pr(F,B|L) and
Pr(B|L), where B refers to “bank teller”, F to “active in feminist movement”
and L to the description of Linda [10].
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.
She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice,
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which is more probable?
(a) Linda is a bank teller.
(b) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement.
Figure 2: Linda problem
Multiple studies have shown that people tend to consistently select the sec-
ond hypothesis as more probable, which is in conflict with the conjunction rule.
In other words, it always holds for the Linda problem that
Pr(F,B|L) ≤ Pr(B|L).
Preference for the alternative F ∧ B (option (b) in Figure 2) is thus always a
logical fallacy. For example, Tversky and Kahneman [153] report that 85% of
their subjects indicated (b) as the more probable option for the Linda problem.
The conjunction fallacy has been shown across multiple settings (hypothetical
scenarios, real-life domains), as well as for various kinds of subjects (university
students, children, experts, as well as statistically sophisticated individuals)
[146].
The conjunction fallacy is often explained by use of the representativeness
heuristic [79]. The representativeness heuristic refers to the tendency to make
judgments based on similarity, based on the rule “like goes with like”, which
is typically used to determine whether an object belongs to a specific category.
When people use the representativeness heuristic, “probabilities are evaluated
by the degree to which A is representative of B, that is by the degree to which A
resembles B” [151]. This heuristic provides people with means for assessing a
probability of an uncertain event. It is used to answer questions such as “What
is the probability that object A belongs to class B? What is the probability that
event A originates from process B?” [151].
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The representativeness heuristic is not the only explanation for the results of
the conjunction fallacy experiments. Hertwig et al. [70] hypothesized that the
fallacy is caused by “a misunderstanding about conjunction”, in other words
by a different interpretation of “probability” and “and” by the subjects than
assumed by the experimenters. The validity of this alternative hypothesis has
been subject to criticism [146], nevertheless some empirical evidence suggests
that the problem of correct understanding of “and” is of particular importance
to rule learning [52].
Recent research has provided several explanations for conjunctive and dis-
junctive (cf. Section 5.4) fallacies, such as configural weighting and adding the-
ory [111], applying principles of quantum cognition [21] and inductive confir-
mation theory [147]. In the following, we will focus on the CWA theory. CWA
essentially assumes that the causes of conjuctive and disjunctive fallacies relate
to the fact that decision makers perform weighted average instead of multipli-
cation of the component probabilities. For conjunctions, weights are set so that
more weight is assigned to the lower component probability. For disjunctive
probabilities, more weight is assigned to the likely component. This assump-
tion was verified in at least one study [41]. For more discussion of the related
averaging heuristic, cf. Section 5.3.
Implications for rule learning. Rules are not composed only of conditions, but
also of an outcome (the value of a target variable in the consequent). A higher
number of conditions generally allows the rule to filter a purer set of objects with
respect to the value of the target variable than a smaller number of conditions.
Application of representativeness heuristic can affect the human perception of
rule plausibility in that rules that are more ”representative” of the user’s men-
tal image of the concept may be preferred even in cases when their objective
discriminatory power may be lower.
Debiasing techniques. A number of factors that decrease the proportion of sub-
jects exhibiting the conjunction fallacy have been identified: Charness et al. [24]
found that the number of participants committing the fallacy is reduced under
a monetary incentive. Such an addition was reported to drop the fallacy rate
in their study from 58% to 33%. The observed rate under a monetary incentive
suggests smaller importance of this problem for important real-life decisions.
Zizzo et al. [172] found that unless the decision problem is simplified, neither
monetary incentives nor feedback can ameliorate the fallacy rate. A reduced
task complexity is a precondition for monetary incentives and feedback to be
effective.
Stolarz-Fantino et al. [143] observed that the rate of fallacies is reduced but
still strongly present when the subjects receive training in logic. Gigerenzer and
Goldstein [60] as well as Gigerenzer and Hoffrage [62] showed that the rate of
fallacies can be reduced or even eliminated by presenting the problems in terms
of frequencies rather than probabilities.
Nilsson et al. [111] present a computer simulation showing that when the
component probabilities are not precisely known, averaging often provides equally
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good alternative to the normative computation of probabilities (cf. also Juslin
et al. [76]). This computational model could be possibly adopted to detect
high risk of fallacy, corresponding to the case when the deviation between the
perceived probability and the normative probability is high.
5.2. Misunderstanding of “and”
The misunderstanding of “and” refers to a phenomenon affecting the syntac-
tic comprehensibility of the logical connective “and”. As discussed by Hertwig
et al. [70], “and” in natural language can express several relationships, including
temporal order, causal relationship, and most importantly, can also indicate a
collection of sets2 as well as their intersection. People can therefore interpret
“and” in a different meaning than intended.
For example, according to the two experiments reported by Hertwig et al.
[70], the conjunction “bank teller and active in the feminist movement” used
in the Linda problem (cf. Section 5.1) was found by about half of subjects
as ambiguous—they explicitly asked the experimenter how “and” was to be
understood. Furthermore, when participants indicated how they understood
“and” by shading Venn diagrams, it turned out that about a quarter of them
interpreted “and” as union rather than intersection, which is usually assumed
by experimenters using the Linda problem.
Implications for rule learning. The formation of conjunctions via “and” is a
basic building block of rules. Its correct understanding is thus important for
effective communication of results of rule learning. Existing studies suggest that
the most common type of error is understanding “and” as a union rather than
intersection. In such a case, a rule containing multiple “ands” will be perceived
as having a higher support than it actually has. Each additional condition will
be incorrectly perceived as increasing the coverage of the rule. This implies
higher perceived plausibility of the rule. Misunderstanding of “and” will thus
generally increase the preference of rules with more conditions.
Debiasing techniques. According to Sides et al. [135] “and” ceases to be ambigu-
ous when it is used to connect propositions rather than categories. The authors
give the following example of a sentence which is not prone to misunderstand-
ing: “IBM stock will rise tomorrow and Disney stock will fall tomorrow.” A
similar wording of rule learning results may be, despite its verbosity, preferred.
Mellers et al. [97] showed that using “bank tellers who are feminists” or
“feminist bank tellers” rather than “bank tellers and feminists” as a category
in the Linda problem (Figure 2) might reduce the likelihood of committing the
conjunction fallacy. It follows that using different wording such as “and also”
might also help reduce the danger of a misunderstanding of “and”.
Representations that visually express the semantics of “and” such as decision
trees may be preferred over rules, which do not provide such visual guidance.3
2As in “He invited friends and colleagues to the party”
3We find limited grounding for this proposition in the following: Conditions connected with
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5.3. Averaging Heuristic
While the conjunction fallacy is most commonly explained by operation of
the representativeness heuristic, the averaging heuristic provides an alternative
explanation: it suggests that people evaluate the probability of a conjuncted
event as the average of probabilities of the component events [38]. As reported
by Fantino et al. [38], in their experiment “approximately 49% of variance in
subjects’ conjunctions could be accounted for by a model that simply averaged
the separate component likelihoods that constituted a particular conjunction.”
Implications for rule learning. When applying the averaging heuristic, an ana-
lyst may not fully realize the consequences of the presence of a low-probability
condition for the overall likelihood of the set of conditions in the antecedent of
the rule.
Consider the following example: Let us assume that the learning algorithm
only adds independent conditions that have a probability of 0.8, and we compare
a 3-condition rule to a 2-condition rule. Averaging would evaluate both rules
equally, because both have an average probability of 0.8. A correct computation
of the joint probability, however, shows that the longer rule is considerably less
likely (0.83 vs. 0.82 because all conditions are assumed to be independent).
Averaging can also affect same-length rules. Fantino et al. [38] derive from
their experiments on the averaging heuristic that humans tend to judge “un-
likely information [to be] relatively more important than likely information.”
Continuing our example, if we compare the above 2-condition rule with another
rule with two features with more diverse probability values, e.g., one condition
has 1.0 and the other has 0.6, then averaging would again evaluate both rules
the same, but in fact the correct interpretation would be that the rule with equal
probabilities is more likely than the other (0.82 > 1.0 × 0.6). In this case, the
low 0.6 probability in the new rule would “knock down” the normative conjoint
probability below the one of the rule with two 0.8 conditions.
Debiasing techniques. Experiments conducted by Zizzo et al. [172] showed that
prior knowledge of probability theory, and a direct reminder of how probabilities
are combined, are effective tools for decreasing the incidence of the conjunc-
tion fallacy, which is the hypothesized consequence of the averaging heuristic.
A specific countermeasure for the biases caused by linear additive integration
(weighted averaging) is the use of logarithm formats. Experiments conducted
by Juslin et al. [77] show that recasting probability computation in terms of log-
arithm formats, thus requiring additive rather than multiplicative integration,
improves probabilistic reasoning.
an arch in a tree are to be interpreted as simultaneously valid (i.e., arch means conjunction). A
recent empirical study on comprehensibility of decision trees [119] does not consider ambiguity
of this notation to be a systematic problem among the surveyed users.
14
5.4. Disjunction Fallacy
The disjunction fallacy refers to a judgment that is inconsistent with the
disjunction rule, which states that the probability Pr(X) cannot be higher than
the probability Pr(Z), where Z = X ∪ Y is a union of event X with another
event Y .
In experiments reported by Bar-Hillel and Neter [11], X and Z were nested
pairs of categories, such as Switzerland and Europe. Subjects read descriptions
of people such as “Writes letter home describing a country with snowy wild
mountains, clean streets, and flower decked porches. Where was the letter
written?” It follows that since Europe contains Switzerland, Europe must be
more likely than Switzerland. However, Switzerland was chosen as the more
likely place by about 75% of the participants [11].
The disjunction fallacy is considered as another consequence of the rep-
resentativeness heuristic [11]: “Which of two events—even nested events—will
seem more probable is better predicted by their representativeness than by their
scope, or by the level in the category hierarchy in which they are located.” The
description in the example is more representative of Switzerland than of Eu-
rope, so when people use representativeness as the basis for their judgment,
they judge Switzerland to be a more likely answer than Europe, even though
this judgment breaks the disjunction rule.
Implications for rule learning. In the context of data mining, it can be the
case that the feature space is hierarchically ordered. The analyst can thus
be confronted with rules containing attributes (literals) on multiple levels of
granularity. Following the disjunction fallacy, the analyst will generally prefer
rules containing more specific attributes, which can result in preference for rules
with fewer backing instances and thus in weaker statistical validity.
Debiasing techniques. When asked to assign categories to concepts (such as
land of origin of a letter) under conditions of certainty, people are known to
prefer a specific category to a more general category that subsumes it, but only
if the specific category is considered representative [11]: “whenever an order-
ing of events by representativeness differs from their ordering by set inclusion,
there is a potential for an extension fallacy to occur.” From this observation
a possible debiasing strategy emerges: making the analysts aware of the taxo-
nomical relation of the individual attributes and their values. For example, the
user interface can work with the information that Europe contains Switzerland,
possibly actively notifying the analyst on the risk of falling for the disjunctive
fallacy. This intervention can be complemented by “training in rules” [88]. In
this case, the analysts should be explained the benefits of larger supporting
sample associated with more general attributes.
5.5. Base-rate Neglect
People tend to underweigh the evidence provided by base rates, which results
in the so-called base-rate neglect. For example, Kahneman and Tversky [80] gave
participants a description of a person who was selected randomly from a group
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and asked them whether the person is an engineer or a lawyer. Participants
based their judgment mostly on the description of the person and paid little
consideration to the occupational composition of the group, even though the
composition as provided as part of the task and should play a significant role in
the judgment.
Kahneman and Tversky [80] view the base-rate neglect as a possible conse-
quence of the representativeness heuristic [79]. When people base their judgment
of an occupation of a person mostly on similarity of the person to a prototypical
member of the occupation, they ignore other relevant information such as base
rates, which results in the base-rate neglect.
Implications for rule learning. The application of the base rate neglect suggests
that when facing two otherwise identical rules with different values of confidence
and support metrics, an analyst’s preferences will be primarily shaped by the
confidence of the rule. Support corresponds to ”base rate”, which is sometimes
almost completely ignored [80].
It follows that by increasing preference for higher confidence, the base-rate
neglect will generally contribute to a positive correlation between rule length
and plausibility, since longer rules can better adapt to a particular group in data
and thus have a higher confidence than a more general, shorter rules. This is in
contrast to the general bias for simple rules that are implemented by state-of-
the-art rule learning algorithms, because simple rules tend to be more general,
have a higher support, and are thus statistically more reliable.
Debiasing techniques. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage [62] show that representations
in terms of natural frequencies, rather than conditional probabilities, facilitate
the computation of cause’s probability. Confidence is typically presented as
percentage in current software systems. The support rule quality metric is
sometimes presented as a percentage and sometimes as a natural number. It
would foster correct understanding if analysts are consistently presented natural
frequencies in addition to percentages.
5.6. Insensitivity to Sample Size
People tend to underestimate the increased benefit of higher robustness of
estimates that are made on a larger sample, which is called insensitivity to sam-
ple size. The insensitivity to sample size effect can be illustrated by the so-called
hospital problem. In this problem, subjects are asked which hospital is more
likely to record more days in which more than 60 percent of the newborns are
boys. The options are a larger hospital, a smaller hospital, or both hospitals
with about a similar probability. The correct expected answer—the smaller
hospital—was chosen only by 22% of participants in an experiment reported
by Tversky and Kahneman [151]. Insensitivity to sample size may be another
bias resulting from use of the representativeness heuristic [79]. When people use
the representativeness heuristic, they compare the proportion of newborns who
are boys to the proportion expected in the population, ignoring other relevant
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information. Since the proportion is similarly representative of the whole pop-
ulation for both hospitals, most of the participants believed that both hospitals
are equally likely to record days in which more than 60 percents of the newborns
are boys [151].
Implications for rule learning. This effect implies that analysts may be unable
to appreciate the increased reliability of the confidence estimate with increasing
value of support, i.e., they may fail to appreciate that the strength of the con-
nection between antecedent and consequent of a rule rises with an increasing
number of observations. If confronted with two rules, where one of them has a
slightly higher confidence and the second rule a higher support, this cognitive
bias suggests that the analyst will prefer the rule with higher confidence (all
other factors equal).
In the context of this bias, it is important to realize that population size is
statistically irrelevant for determination of sample size for large populations [26].
However, previous research [9] has shown that the perceived sample accuracy
can incorrectly depend on the sample-to-population ratio rather than on the
absolute sample size. For a small population, a 10% sample can be considered
as more reliable than 1% sample drawn from much larger population.
This observation has substantial consequences for the presentation of rule
learning results. The support of a rule is typically presented as a percentage of
the dataset size. Assuming that support relates to sample size and number of
instances in the dataset to population size, it follows that the presentation of
support as a percentage (relative support) induces the insensitivity to sample
size effect. The recommended alternative is to present support as an absolute
number (absolute support).
Debiasing techniques. There have been successful experiments with providing
decision aids to overcome the insensitivity to sample size bias. In particular,
Kachelmeier and Messier Jr [78] experimented with providing auditors a formula
for computing appropriate sample size for substantive tests of details based on
the description of a case and tolerable error. Provision of the aid resulted in
larger sample sizes being selected by the auditors in comparison to intuitive
judgment without the aid. Similarly, as the auditor can choose the sample size,
a user of an association rule learning algorithm can specify the minimum sup-
port threshold. To leverage the debiasing strategy validated by Kachelmeier
and Messier Jr [78], the rule learning interface should also inform the user of
the effects of chosen support threshold on the accuracy of the confidence esti-
mate of the resulting rules. For algorithms and workflows where the user cannot
influence the support of a discovered rule, relevant information should be avail-
able as a part of rule learning results. In particular, the value of rule support
can be used to compute a confidence interval for the value of confidence. Such
supplementary information is already provided by Bayesian decision lists [90],
a recently proposed algorithmic framework positively evaluated with respect to
interpretability (cf., e.g., [28]).
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5.7. Confirmation Bias and Positive Test Strategy
Confirmation bias refers to the notion that people tend to look for evidence
supporting the current hypothesis, disregarding conflicting evidence. According
to Evans [35, p. 552] confirmation bias is “the best known and most widely
accepted notion of inferential error of human reasoning.”4
Research suggests that even neutral or unfavorable evidence can be inter-
preted to support existing beliefs, or, as Trope et al. [148, p. 115–116] put it,
“the same evidence can be constructed and reconstructed in different and even
opposite ways, depending on the perceiver’s hypothesis.”
A closely related phenomenon is the positive test strategy (PTS) described
by Klayman and Ha [82]. This reasoning strategy suggests that when trying to
test a specific hypothesis, people examine cases which they expect to confirm the
hypothesis rather than the cases which have the best chance of falsifying it. The
difference between PTS and confirmation bias is that PTS is applied to test a
candidate hypothesis while confirmation bias is concerned with hypotheses that
are already established [121, p. 93]. The experimental results of Klayman and
Ha [82] show that under realistic conditions, PTS can be a very good heuristic
for determining whether a hypothesis is true or false, but it can also lead to
systematic errors if applied to an inappropriate task.
Implications for rule learning. This bias can have a significant impact depending
on the purpose for which the rule learning results are used. If the analyst has
some prior hypothesis before she obtains the rule learning results, according to
the confirmation bias she will tend to “cherry pick” rules confirming this prior
hypothesis and disregard rules that contradict it. Given that some rule learners
may output contradicting rules, the analyst may tend to select only the rules
conforming to the hypothesis, disregarding applicable rules with the opposite
conclusion, which could otherwise turn out to be more relevant.
Debiasing techniques. Delaying final judgment and slowing down work has been
found to decrease confirmation bias in several studies [140, 118]. User interfaces
for rule learning should thus give the user not only the opportunity to save or
mark interesting rules, but also allow the user to review and edit the model
at a later point in time. An example rule learning system with this specific
functionality is EasyMiner [158].
Wolfe and Britt [169] successfully experimented with providing subjects with
explicit guidelines for considering evidence both for and against a hypothesis.
Provision of “balanced” instructions to search evidence for and against a given
hypothesis reduced the incidence of myside bias, an effect closely related to
confirmation bias, from 50% exhibited by the control group to a significantly
lower 27.5%.
Similarly, providing explicit guidance combined with modifications of the
user interface of the system presenting the rule learning results could also be
4Cited according to Nickerson [110].
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considered. The assumption that educating users about cognitive illusions can
be an effective debiasing technique for positive test strategy has been empirically
validated on a cohort of adolescents by Barberia et al. [12].
5.8. Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic is a judgmental heuristic in which a person evalu-
ates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by the ease with which
relevant instances come to mind. This heuristic is explained by its discoverers,
Tversky and Kahneman [150], as follows: “That associative bonds are strength-
ened by repetition is perhaps the oldest law of memory known to man. The
availability heuristic exploits the inverse form of this law, that is, it uses the
strength of the association as a basis for the judgment of frequency.” The avail-
ability heuristic is not itself a bias, but it may lead to biased judgments when
availability is not a valid cue.
In one of the original experiments, participants were asked whether the let-
ter “R” appears more frequently on the first or third position in English texts
[150]. About 70% of participants answered incorrectly that it appears more fre-
quently on the first position, presumably because they estimated the frequency
by recalling words containing “R” and it is easier to recall words starting with
R than words with R on the third position.
While original research did not distinguish between the number of recollected
instances and ease of the recollection, later studies showed that to determine
availability, it is sufficient to assess the ease with which instances or associations
could be brought to mind; it is not necessary to count all the instances one is
able to come up with [131].
Implications for rule learning. An application of the availability heuristic in
rule learning would be based on the ease of recollection of instances (exam-
ples) matching the complete rule (all conditions and consequent) by the analyst.
Rules containing conditions for which instances can be easily recalled would be
found more plausible compared to rules not containing such conditions. As an
example, consider the rule pair
R1: IF latitude ≤ 44.189 AND longitude ≤ 6.3333
AND longitude > 1.8397 THEN Unemployment is high
R2: IF population ≤ 5 million THEN Unemployment is high.
It is arguably easier to recall specific countries matching the second rule, than
countries matching the conditions of the first rule.
It is conceivable that the availability heuristic could also be applied in case
when the easily recalled instances match only some of the conditions in the an-
tecedent of the rule, such as only latitude in the example above. The remaining
conditions would be ignored.
On the other hand, such a bias can also be implemented as a bias into
rule learning algorithms. Often, in particular in cases where many candidate
conditions are available, such as datasets with features derived from the semantic
web [127], the same information can be encoded in rules that use different sets
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of conditions. For example, Gabriel et al. [53] proposed an algorithm that gives
preference to selecting conditions that are semantically coherent. A similar
technique could be used for realizing a preference for attributes that are easier
to recall for human analysts.
Debiasing techniques. Several studies have found that people use ease of recol-
lection in judgment only when they cannot attribute it to a source that should
not influence their judgment [130]. Alerting an analyst to the reason why in-
stances matching the conditions in the rule under consideration are easily re-
called should therefore reduce the impact of the availability heuristic as long as
the reason is deemed irrelevant to the task at hand.
5.9. Reiteration Effect, Effects of Validity and Illusiory Truth
The reiteration effect describes the phenomenon that repeated statements
tend to become more believable [71, 116]. For example, in one experiment,
Hasher et al. [69] presented subjects with general statements and asked them to
asses their validity. Part of the statements were false and part were true. The
experiment was conducted in several sessions, where some of the statements
were repeated in subsequent sessions. The average perceived validity of both
true and false repeated statements rose between the sessions, while for non-
repeated statements it dropped slightly.
The effect is usually explained by use of processing fluency in judgment.
Statements that are processed fluently (easily) tend to be judged as true and
repetition makes processing easier. A recent alternative account argues that
repetition makes the referents of statements more coherent and people judge
truth based on coherency [155].
The reiteration effect is also known under different labels, such as “frequency-
validity” or “illusory truth” [71, 195]. However, some research suggests that
these are not identical phenomena. For example, the truth effect “disappears
when the actual truth status is known” [122, p. 253], which does not hold for
validity effect in general. There is also a clear distinction between the effects
covered here, and the mere exposure effect covered in Section 5.10: the truth
effect has been found largely independent of duration of stimulus exposure [29,
p. 245].
Implications for rule learning. In the rule learning context, a repeating state-
ment which becomes more believable corresponds to the entire rule or possibly
a “subrule” consisting of the consequent of the rule and a subset of conditions in
its antecedent. A typical rule learning result contains multiple rules that are sub-
stantially overlapping. If the analyst is exposed to multiple similar statements,
the reiteration effect will increase the analyst’s belief in the repeating subrule.
Especially in the area of association rule learning, a very large set of redundant
rules—covering the same, or nearly same set of examples—is routinely included
in the output.
Schwarz et al. [132] suggest that mere 30 minutes of delay can be enough
for information originally seen as negative to have positive influence. Applying
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this in a data exploration task, consider an analyst who is presented a large
number of “weak” rules corresponding to highly speculative patterns of data.
Even if the analyst rejects the rule—for example based on the presented metrics,
pre-existing domain knowledge or common sense—the validity and truthfulness
effects will make the analyst more prone to accept a similar rule later.
Debiasing techniques. The reiteration effect can be suppressed already on the
algorithmic level by ensuring that rule learning output does not contain redun-
dant rules. This can be achieved by pruning algorithms [47]. Another possible
technique is presenting the result of rule learning in several layers, where only
clusters of rules (“rule covers”) summarizing multiple sub rules are presented
at first [114]. The user can expand the cluster to obtain more similar rules. A
more recent algorithm that can be used for summarizing multiple rules is the
meta-learning method proposed by [16].
Several lessons can be learnt from Hess and Hagen [73], who studied the role
of the reiteration effect for spreading of gossip. Interestingly, already simple re-
iteration was found to increase gossip veracity, but only for those who found the
gossip relatively uninteresting. Multiple sources of gossip were found to increase
its veracity, especially when these sources were independent. Information that
explained the gossip by providing benign interpretation decreased the veracity
of gossip. These findings suggest that it is important to explain to the analyst
which rules share the same source, i.e. what is the overlap in their coverage in
terms of specific instances. Second, explanations can be improved by utilisation
of recently proposed techniques that use domain knowledge to filter or explain
rules, such as expert deduction rules proposed by Rauch [126].
The research related to debiasing validity and truth effects has been largely
centered around the problem of debunking various forms of misinformation (cf.,
e.g., [132, 91, 32]). The current largely accepted recommendation is that to
correct a misinformation, it is best to address it directly – repeat the misin-
formation along with arguments against it [91, 32]. This can be applied, for
example, in incremental machine learning settings, when the results of learn-
ing are revised when new data arrive, or when mining with formalized domain
knowledge. Generally, when the system has knowledge of the analyst being pre-
viously presented a rule (a hypothesis), which is falsified following the current
state of knowledge, the system can explicitly notify the analyst, listing the rule
in question and explaining why it does not hold.
5.10. Mere Exposure Effect
According to the mere exposure effect, repeated exposure to an object re-
sults in an increased preference (liking, affect) for that object. When a concrete
stimulus is repeatedly exposed, the preference for that stimulus increases loga-
rithmically as a function of the number of exposures [20]. The size of the mere
exposure effect also depends on whether the stimulus the subject is exposed to
is exactly the same as in prior exposure or only similar to it [103]—the same
stimuli are associated with larger mere exposure effect. The mere exposure ef-
fect is another consequence of increased fluency of processing associated with
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repeated exposure (cf. Section 5.9) [167]. While the reitaration effect referred
to the use of processing fluency in judgment of truth, the mere exposure effect
relates to the positive feeling that is associated with fluent processing.
Duration of the exposure below 1 second produces the strongest effects, with
increasing time of exposure the effect drops and repeating exposures decrease the
mere exposure effect. The liking induced by the effect drops more quickly with
increasing exposures when the presented stimuli is simple (e.g., an ideogram) as
opposed to complex (e.g., a photograph) [20]. A recent meta analysis suggests
that there is an inverted-U shaped relation between exposure and affect [104].
Implications for rule learning. The extent to which the mere exposure effect
can affect the interpretation of rule leaning results is limited by the fact that
that its magnitude decreases with extended exposure to the stimuli. It can be
expected that the analysts inspect the rule learning results for a much longer
period of time than the 1 second below which exposure results in the strongest
effects [20]. However, it is not unusual for rule-based models to be composed
of several thousand rules [3]. When the user scrolls through a list of rules, each
rule can be shown only for a fraction of a second. The analyst is not aware of
having seen the rule, yet the rule can influence the analyst’s judgment through
the mere exposure effect.
The mere exposure effect can also play a role when rules from the text mining
or sentiment analysis domains are interpreted. The initial research of the mere
exposure effect by Zajonc [170] included experimental evidence on the positive
correlation between word frequency and affective connotation of the word. From
this it follows that a rule containing frequently occurring words can induce the
mere exposure effect.
Debiasing techniques. While there is a considerable body of research focusing
on the mere exposure effect, our literature survey did not result in any directly
applicable debiasing techniques. Only recently, Becker and Rinck [15] reported
the first reversal of the mere exposure effect. This was achieved by present-
ing threatening materials (spider pictures) to people fearful of spiders in an
unpleasant detection situation. This result, although interesting, is difficult to
transpose to the domain of rules.
Nevertheless, there are some conditions known to decrease the mere exposure
effect that can be utilized in machine learning interfaces. The effect is strongest
for repeated, “flash-like” presentation of information. A possible workaround is
to avoid subliminal exposure completely, by changing the mode of operation of
the corresponding user interfaces. One attempt at a user interface to rule learn-
ing respecting these principles is the EasyMiner system [159]. In EasyMiner,
the user precisely formulates the mining task as a query against data. This
restricts the number of rules that are discovered and the user is consequently
exposed to.
5.11. Overconfidence and underconfidence
A decision maker’s judgment is normally associated with belief that the
judgment is true, i.e., with confidence in the judgment. Griffin and Tversky [65]
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argue that confidence in judgment is based on a combination of the strength of
evidence and its weight (credibility). According to their studies, people tend
to combine strength with weight in suboptimal ways, resulting in the decision
maker being too much or too little confident about the hypothesis at hand than
would be normatively appropriate given the available information. This dis-
crepancy between the normative confidence and the decision maker’s confidence
is called overconfidence or underconfidence.
People use the provided data to assess a hypothesis, but they insufficiently
regard the quality of the data. Griffin and Tversky [65] describe this manifesta-
tion of bounded rationality as follows: “If people focus primarily on the warmth
of the recommendation with insufficient regard for the credibility of the writer,
or the correlation between the predictor and the criterion, they will be overcon-
fident when they encounter a glowing letter based on casual contact, and they
will be underconfident when they encounter a moderately positive letter from a
highly knowledgeable source.”
Implications for rule learning. Research has revealed systematic patterns of
overconfidence and underconfidence [65, p. 426]: If the estimated difference
between two hypotheses is large, it is easy to say which one is better and there
is a pattern of underconfidence. As the degree of difficulty rises (the difference
between the normative confidence of two competing hypotheses is decreasing),
there is an increasing pattern of overconfidence.
The strongest overconfidence was recorded for problems where the weight of
evidence is low and the strength of evidence is high. This directly applies to rules
with high value of confidence and low value of support. The empirical results
related to the effect of difficulty therefore suggest that the predictive ability of
such rules will be substantially overrated by analysts. This is particularly inter-
esting because rule learning algorithms often suffer from a tendency to unduly
prefer overly specific rules that have a high confidence on small parts of the data
to more general rules that have a somewhat lower confidence, a phenomenon
also known as overfitting. The above-mentioned results seem to indicate that
humans suffer from a similar problem (albeit presumably for different reasons),
which, e.g., implies that a human-in-the-loop solution may not alleviate this
problem.
Debiasing techniques. Research applicable to debiasing of overconfidence orig-
inated in 1950’, but most initial efforts to reduce overconfidence have failed
[40, 7]. Some recent research focuses on the hypothesis that the feeling of confi-
dence reflects factors indirectly related to choice processes [45, 67]. For example,
in a sport betting experiment performed by Hall et al. [67], participants under-
weighted statistical cues while betting, when they knew the names of players.
This research leads to the conclusion that “more knowledge can decrease ac-
curacy and simultaneously increase prediction confidence” [67]. Applying this
to debiasing in the rule learning context, presenting less information can be
achieved by reducing the number of rules and removing some conditions in the
remaining rules. This can be achieved by a number of methods, such as feature
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selection to external setting of maximum antecedent length, which is permitted
by some algorithms. Also, rules and conditions that do not pass a statistical
significance test can be removed from the output.
As with other biases, research on debiasing overconfidence points at the im-
portance of educating the experts on principles of subjective probability judg-
ment and the associated biases [25]. Shafir [134, p. 487] recommends to debias
overconfidence (in policy making) by making the subject hear both sides of an
argument. In the rule learning context, this would correspond to the user inter-
face making rules and knowledge easily accessible, which is in ”unexpectedness”
or ”exception” relation with the rule in question, as, e.g., experimented with in
frameworks postprocessing association rule learning results [83].
5.12. Recognition Heuristic
Pachur et al. [116] define the recognition heuristic as follows: “For two-
alternative choice tasks, where one has to decide which of two objects scores
higher on a criterion, the heuristic can be stated as follows: If one object is
recognized, but not the other, then infer that the recognized object has a higher
value on the criterion.” In contrast with the availability heuristic, which is
based on ease of recall, the recognition heuristic is based only on the fact that
a given object is recognized. The two heuristics could be combined. When only
one object in a pair is recognized, then the recognition heuristic would be used
for judgment. If both objects are recognized, then the speed of the recognition
could influence the choice [72].
The use of this heuristic could be seen from an experiment performed by
Goldstein and Gigerenzer [64], which focused on estimating which of two cities
in a presented pair is more populated. People using the recognition heuristic
would say that the city they recognize has a higher population. The median
proportion of judgments complying to the recognition heuristic was 93%. It
should be noted that the application of this heuristic is in this case ecologically
justified since recognition will be related to how many times the city appeared
in a newspaper report, which in turn is related to the city size [14].
Implications for rule learning. The recognition heuristic can manifest itself by
preference for rules containing a recognized attribute name or value in the an-
tecedent of the rule. Analysts processing rule learning results are typically
shown many rules, contributing to time pressure. This can further increase the
impact of the recognition heuristic.
Empirical results reported by Michalkiewicz et al. [98] indicate that peo-
ple with higher cognitive ability use the recognition heuristic more when it is
successful and less when it is not. The work of Pohl et al. [123] shows that
people adapt their decision strategy with respect to the more general environ-
ment rather than the specific items they are faced with. Considering that the
application of the recognition heuristic can in some situations lead to better
results than the use of available knowledge, the recognition heuristic may not
necessarily have overly negative impacts on the intepretation of rule learning
results.
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Debiasing techniques. Under time pressure people assign a higher value to rec-
ognized objects than to unrecognized objects. This happens also in situations
when recognition is a poor cue [115]. Changes to user interfaces that induce
“slowing down” could thus help to address this bias. As to the alleviation of
effects of recognition heuristic in situations where it is ecologically unsuitable,
Pachur and Hertwig [115] note that suspension of the heuristic requires addi-
tional time or direct knowledge of the “criterion variable”. In typical real-world
machine learning tasks, the data can include a high number of attributes that
even experts are not acquainted with in detail. When these are recognized (but
not understood), even experts may be liable to the recognition heuristic. When
information on the meaning of individual attributes and literals is made easily
accessible, we conjecture that the application of the recognition heuristic can
be suppressed.
5.13. Information Bias
Information bias refers to the tendency to seek more information to improve
the perceived validity of a statement even if the additional information is not
relevant or helpful. The typical manifestation of the information bias is evaluat-
ing questions as worth asking even when the answer cannot affect the hypothesis
that will be accepted [13].
For example, Baron et al. [13] asked subjects to assess to what degree a
medical test is suitable for deciding which of three diseases to treat. The test
detected a chemical, which was with a certain probability associated with each
of the three diseases. These probabilities varied across the cases. Even though
in some of the cases an outcome of the test would not change the most likely
disease and thus the treatment, people tended to judge the test as worth doing.
While information bias is primarily researched in the context of information
acquisition [109, 107], some scientists interpret this more generally as judging
features with zero probability gain as useful, having potential to change one’s
belief [108, p. 158].
Implications for rule learning. Many rule learning algorithms allow the user to
select the size of the generated model – in terms of the number of rules that
will be presented, as well as by setting the maximum length of conditions of the
generated rules. Either as part of the feature selection, or when defining con-
straints for the learning, the users decide which attributes are relevant. These
can then appear among conditions of the discovered rules.
According to the information bias, people will be prone to setup the task
so that they receive more information – resulting in larger rule list with longer
rules containing attributes with little information value.
It is unclear if the information effect applies also to the case when the user
is readily presented with more information, rather then given the possibility
to request more information. Given the proximity of these two scenarios, we
conjecture that information bias (or some related bias) will make people prefer
more information to less, even if it is obviously not relevant.
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According to the information bias, a rule containing additional (redundant)
condition may be preferred to a rule not containing this condition.
Debiasing techniques. While informing people about the diagnosticity of con-
sidered questions does not completely remove the information bias, it reduces
it [13]. To this end, communicating attribute importance can help guide the
analyst in the task definition phase.
Although existing algorithms and systems already provide ways for deter-
mining the importance of individual rules, for example via values of confidence,
support, and lift, the cues on the importance of individual conditions in rule
antecedent are typically not provided. While feature importance is computed
within many learning algorithms, it is often used only internally. Exposing this
information to the user can help counter the information bias.
5.14. Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity aversion refers to the tendency to prefer known risks over un-
known risks. This is often illustrated by the Ellsberg paradox [34], which shows
that humans tend to systematically prefer a bet with known probability of win-
ning over a bet with not precisely known probability of winning, even if it means
that their choice is systematically influenced by irrelevant factors.
As argued by Camerer and Weber [22], ambiguity aversion is related to the
information bias: the demand for information in cases when it has no effect on
decision can be explained by the aversion to ambiguity — people dislike having
missing information.
Implications for rule learning. The ambiguity aversion may have profound im-
plications for rule learning. The typical data mining task will contain a number
of attributes the analyst has no or very limited knowledge of. The ambigu-
ity aversion will manifest itself in a preference for rules that do not contain
ambiguous conditions.
Debiasing techniques. An empirically proven way to reduce ambiguity aversion
is accountability – “the expectation on the side of the decision maker of hav-
ing to justify her decisions to somebody else” [156]. This debiasing technique
is hypothesized to work through higher cognitive effort that is induced by ac-
countability.
This can be applied in the rule learning context by requiring the analysts
to provide justifications for why they evaluated a specific discovered rule as
interesting. Such explanation can be textual, but also can have a structured
form. To decrease demands on the analyst, the explanation may only be required
only if a conflict with existing knowledge has been automatically detected, for
example, using approach proposed by Rauch [126].
Since the application of the ambiguity aversion can partly stem from the
lack of knowledge of the conditions included in the rule, it is conceivable this
bias would be alleviated if description of the meaning of the conditions is made
easily accessible to the analyst, as demonstrated in e.g. [83].
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5.15. Confusion of the Inverse
This effect corresponds to confusing the probability of cause and effect, or,
formally, confidence of an implication A → B with its inverse B → A, i.e.,
Pr(B|A) is confused with the inverse probability Pr(A | B). For example,
Villejoubert and Mandel [157] showed in an experiment that about half of the
participants estimating the probability of membership in a class gave most of
their estimates that corresponded to the inverse probability.
Implications for rule learning. The confusion of the direction of an implica-
tion sign has significant consequences on the interpretation of a rule. Already
Michalski [100] noted that there are two different kinds of rules, discriminative
and characteristic. Discriminative rules can quickly discriminate an object of
one category from objects of other categories. A simple example is the rule
IF trunk THEN elephant
which states that an animal with a trunk is an elephant. This implication
provides a simple but effective rule for recognizing elephants among all animals.
Characteristic rules, on the other hand, try to capture all properties that are
common to the objects of the target class. A rule for characterizing elephants
could be
IF elephant THEN heavy, large, grey, bigEars, tusks, trunk.
Note that here the implication sign is reversed: we list all properties that are
implied by the target class, i.e., by an animal being an elephant. From the point
of understandability, characteristic rules are often preferable to discriminative
rules. For example, in a customer profiling application, we might prefer to not
only list a few characteristics that discriminate one customer group from the
other, but are interested in all characteristics of each customer group.
Characteristic rules are very much related to formal concept analysis [165,
55]. Informally, a concept is defined by its intent (the description of the con-
cept, i.e., the conditions of its defining rule) and its extent (the instances that
are covered by these conditions). A formal concept is then a concept where
the extension and the intension are Pareto-maximal, i.e., a concept where no
conditions can be added without reducing the number of covered examples. In
Michalski’s terminology, a formal concept is both discriminative and character-
istic, i.e., a rule where the head is equivalent to the body.
The confusion of the inverse thus seems to imply that humans will not clearly
distinguish between these types of rules, and, in particular, tend to interpret
an implication as an equivalence. From this, we can infer that characteristic
rules, which add all possible conditions even if they do not have additional
discriminative power, may be preferable to short discriminative rules.
This confusion may manifest itself strongest in the area of association rule
learning, where an attribute can be of interest to the analyst both in the an-
tecedent and consequent of a rule.
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Debiasing techniques. Edgell et al. [33] studied the influence of the effect of
training of analysts in probabilistic theory with the conclusion that it is not
effective in addressing the confusion of the inverse fallacy.
Werner et al. [163, p. 195] point at a concern regarding use of language liable
to misinterpretation in statistical textbooks teaching fundamental concepts such
as independence. The authors illustrate the misinterpretation on the statement
whenever Y has no effect on X as “This statement is used to explain that two
variables, X and Y, are independent and their joint distribution is simply the
product of their margins. However, for many experts, the term ’effect’ might
imply a causal relationship.” From this it follows that representations of rules
should strive for unambiguous meaning of the wording of the implication con-
struct. The specific recommendations provided by Dı´az et al. [31] for teaching
probability can also be considered in the next generation of textbooks aimed at
the data science audience.
5.16. Context and Tradeoff Contrast Effects
People evaluate objects in relation to other available objects, which may
lead to various effects of context of presentation of a choice. For example, in
one of the experiments described by Tversky and Simonson [154], subjects were
asked to choose between two microwave ovens (Panasonic priced 180 USD and
Emerson priced 110 USD), both a third off the regular price. The number of
subjects who chose Emerson was 57% and 43% chose Panasonic. Another group
of subjects was presented the same problem with the following manipulation:
A more expensive Panasonic valued at 200 USD (10% off the regular price) was
added to the list of possible options. The newly added device was described
to look as inferior to the other Panasonic, but not to the Emerson device.
After this manipulation, only 13% chose the more expensive Panasonic, but
the number of subjects choosing the less expensive Panasonic rose from 43% to
60%. That is, even though the additional option was dominated by the cheaper
Panasonic device and it should have been therefore irrelevant to the relative
preference of the other ovens, its addition changed the preference in favor of the
better Panasonic device. The experiment thus shows that selection of one of the
available alternatives, such as products or job candidates, can be manipulated
by addition or deletion of alternatives that are otherwise irrelevant. Tversky
and Simonson [154] attribute the tradeoff effect to the fact that “people often
do not have a global preference order and, as a result, they use the context to
identify the most ’attractive’ option.”
It should be noted that according to Tversky and Simonson [154] if people
have well-articulated preferences, the background context has no effect on the
decision.
Implications for rule learning. The effect could be illustrated on the inter-rule
comparison level. In the base scenario, a constrained rule learning yields only
a rule R1 with a confidence value of 0.7. Due to the relatively low value of
confidence, the user does not find the rule very plausible. By lowering the
minimum confidence threshold, multiple other rules predicting the same target
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class are discovered and shown to the user. These other rules, inferior to R1,
would increase the plausibility of R1 by the tradeoff contrast effect.
Debiasing techniques. Marketing professionals sometimes introduce more ex-
pensive versions of the main product, which induces the tradeoff contrast. The
presence of a more expensive alternative with little added value increases sales
of the main product [136]. Somewhat similarly, a rule learning algorithm can
have on its output rules with very high confidence, sometimes even 1.0, but very
low values of support. Removal of such rules can help to debias the analysts.
The influence of context can in some cases improve communication [136, p.
293]. An attempt at making contextual attributes explicit in the rule learning
context was made by Gamberger and Lavracˇ [54], who introduced supporting
factors as a means for complementing the explanation delivered by conventional
learned rules. Essentially, supporting factors are additional attributes that are
not part of the learned rule, but nevertheless have very different distributions
with respect to the classes of the application domain. In line with the results of
Kononenko [84], medical experts found that these supporting factors increase
the plausibility of the found rules.
5.17. Negativity Bias
According to the negativity bias, negative evidence tends to have a greater
effect than neutral or positive evidence of equal intensity [129].
For example, the experiments by Pratto and John [125] investigated whether
the valence of a word (desirable or undesirable trait) has effect on the time re-
quired to identify the color in which the word appears on the screen. The
results showed that the subjects took longer to name the color of an undesirable
word than for a desirable word. The authors argued that the response time
was higher for undesirable words because undesirable traits get more attention.
Information with negative valence is given more attention partly because peo-
ple seek diagnostic information, and negative information is more diagnostic
[137]. Some research suggests that negative information is better memorized
and subsequently recognized [128, 113].
Implications for rule learning. An interesting applicable discovery shows that
negativity is an “attention magnet” [42, 113]. This implies that a rule predict-
ing a class phrased with negative valence will get more attention than a rule
predicting a class phrased with words with positive valence.
Debiasing techniques. Putting a higher weight to negative information may in
some situations be a valid heuristic. What needs to be addressed are cases, when
the relevant piece of information is positive and a less relevant piece of informa-
tion is negative [74, 152]. It is therefore advisable that any such suspected cases
are detected in the data preprocessing phase, and the corresponding attributes
or values are replaced with more neutral sounding alternatives.
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5.18. Primacy Effect
Once people form an initial assessment of plausibility (favorability) of an
option, its subsequent evaluations will reflect this initial disposition.
Bond et al. [19] investigated to what extent changing the order of informa-
tion which is presented to a potential buyer affects the propensity to buy. For
example, in one of the experiments, if the positive information (product descrip-
tion) was presented as first, the number of participants indicating they would
buy the product was 48%. When the negative information (price) was presented
first, this number decreased to 22%. Bond et al. [19] argue that the effect is
caused by distortion of interpretation of new information in the direction of the
already held opinion. The information presented first not only influences dis-
proportionately the final opinion, but it also influences interpretation of novel
information.
Implications for rule learning. Following the primacy effect, the analyst will
favor rules that are presented as first in the rule model. Largest negative effects
of this bias are likely to occur, when such ordering is not observed, for exam-
ple, when rules are presented in the order in which they were discovered by a
breadth-first algorithm. In this case, mental contamination is another applica-
ble bias related to the primacy effect (or in general order effects). This refers to
the case when a presented hypothesis can influence subsequent decision making
by its content, even if the subject is fully aware of the fact that the presented
information is purely speculative [43]. Note that our application scenario differs
from [43] and some other related research, in that cognitive psychology mostly
investigated the effect of asking a hypothetical question, while we are concerned
with considering the plausibility of a presented hypothesis (inductively learnt
rule). Fitzsimons and Shiv [43] found that respondents are not able to prevent
the contamination effects of the hypothetical questions and that the bias in-
creases primarily when the hypothetical question is relevant. This bias is partly
attributed to the application of expectations related to conversational maxims
[63].
Debiasing techniques. Three types of debiasing techniques were examined by
Mumma and Wilson [105] in the context of clinical-like judgments. The bias
inoculation intervention involves direct training on the applicable bias or bi-
ases, consisting of information on the bias, strategies for adjustment, as well as
completing several practical assignments. The second technique was consider-
the-opposite debiasing strategy, which sorts the information according to diag-
nosticity before it is reviewed. The third strategy evaluated was simply taking
notes when reviewing each cue before the final judgment was made. Interest-
ingly, bias inoculation, a representative of direct debiasing techniques, was found
to be the least effective. Consider-the-opposite and taking notes were found to
work equally well.
To this end, a possible debiasing strategy can be founded in presentation
of the most relevant rules first. Similarly, the conditions within the rules can
be ordered by predictive power. Some rule learning algorithms, such as CBA
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[93], readily take advantage of the primacy effect, since they naturally create rule
models that contain rules sorted by their strength. Other algorithms order rules
so that more general rules (i.e., rules that cover more examples) are presented
first. This typically also corresponds to the order in which rules are learned with
the commonly used separate-and-conquer or covering strategies [48]. Simply
reordering the rules output by these algorithms may not work in situations,
when rules compose a rule list that is automatically processed for prediction
purposes.5 In order to take advantage of the note taking debiasing strategy, the
user interface can support the analyst in annotating the individual rules.
Lau and Coiera [89] provide a reason for optimism concerning the debiasing
effect stemming from the proposed changes to user interface of machine learning
tools. Their paper showed debiasing effect of similar changes implemented in
a user interface to an information retrieval system used by consumers to find
health information. Three versions of the system were compared: a baseline
“standard” search interface, anchor debiasing interface, which asked the users
to annotate the read documents as providing evidence for/against/neutral the
proposition in question. Finally, the order debiasing interface reordered the doc-
uments to neutralize the primacy bias by creating a “counteracting order bias”.
This was done by randomly reshuffling a part of the documents. When par-
ticipants used the baseline and anchor debiasing interface, the order effect was
present. On the other hand, the use of the order debiasing interface eliminated
the order effect [89].
5.19. Weak Evidence Effect
According to the weak evidence effect, presenting weak evidence in favor of
an outcome can actually decrease the probability that a person assigns to the
outcome. For example, in an experiment in the area of forensic science reported
by Martire et al. [96], it was shown that participants presented with evidence
weakly supporting guilt tended to “invert” the evidence, thereby counterintu-
itively reducing their belief in the guilt of the accused. Fernbach et al. [39] argue
that the effect occurs because people give undue weight to the weak evidence
and fail to take into account alternative evidence that more strongly favors the
hypothesis at hand.
Implications for rule learning. The weak evidence effect can be directly applied
to rules: the evidence is represented by the rule antecedent; the consequent
corresponds to the outcome. The analyst can intuitively interpret each of the
conditions in the antecedent as a piece of evidence in favor of the outcome.
5One technique that can positively influence comprehensibility of the rule list is prepending
(adding to the beginning) a new rule to the previously learned rules [162]. The intuition behind
this argument is that there are often simple rules that would cover many of the positive
examples, but also cover a few negative examples that have to be excluded as exceptions to
the rule. Placing the simple general rule near the end of the rule list allows us to handle
exceptions with rules that are placed before the general rule and keep the general rule simple.
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Typical of many machine learning problems is the uneven contribution of indi-
vidual attributes to the prediction. Let us assume that the analyst is aware of
the prediction strength of the individual attributes. If the analyst is to choose
from a rule containing only one strong condition (predictor) and another rule
containing a strong predictor and a weak (weak enough to trigger this effect)
predictor, according to the weak evidence effect the analyst should choose the
shorter rule with one predictor.
Debiasing techniques. Martire et al. [95] performed an empirical study aimed
at evaluating what mode of communication of the strength of evidence is most
resilient to the weak evidence effect. The surveyed modes of expression were
numerical, verbal, a table, and a visual scale. It should be noted that the study
was performed in the specific field of assessing evidence by a juror in a trial and
the verbal expressions were following standards proposed by the Association of
Forensic Science Providers [166].6 The results clearly suggested that numerical
expressions of evidence are most suitable for expressing uncertainty.
Likelihood ratios studied by Martire et al. [95] are conceptually close to the
lift metric, used to characterize association rules. While lift is still typically pre-
sented as a number in machine learning user interfaces, there has been research
towards communicating rule learning results in natural language since at least
2005 [144]. With recent resurgence of interest in interpretable models, the use
of natural language has been taken up by commercial machine learning services,
such as BigML, which allow to generate predictions via spoken questions and
answers using Amazon Alexa voice service.7 Similarly, machine learning inter-
faces increasingly rely on visualizations. The research on debiasing of the weak
evidence effect suggests that when conveying machine learning results using
modern means, such as transformation to natural language or through visual-
izations, care must be taken when numerical information is communicated.
Martire et al. [95] also observe high level of miscommunication associated
with low-strength verbal expressions. In these instances, it is “appropriate to
question whether expert opinions in the form of verbal likelihood ratios should
be offered at all” [95]. Transposing this result to the machine learning context,
we suggest to consider intentional omission of weak predictors from rules either
directly by the rule learner or as part of feature selection.
5.20. Unit Bias
The unit bias refers to the tendency to give each unit similar weight while
ignoring or underweighing the size of the unit [56].
Geier et al. [56] offered people various food items in two different sizes on
different days and observed how this would affect consumption of the food. They
found that people ate larger amount of food when the size of a single unit of
6These provide guidelines on translation of numerical likelihood ratios into verbal formats.
For example, likelihood “> 1 − 10” is translated as “weak or limited”, and likelihood of
“1000 − 10, 000” as “strong”.
7https://bigml.com/tools/alexa-voice
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the food item was big than when it was small. A possible explanation is that
people ate one unit of food at a time without taking into account how big it was.
Because the food was not consumed in larger amounts at any single occasion,
but was rather eaten intermittently, the behavior led to higher consumption
when a unit of food was larger.
Implications for rule learning. Unit bias was so far primarily studied for quite
different purposes than is the domain of machine learning. Nevertheless, as
we will argue in the following, it can be very relevant for the domain of rule
learning.
From a technical perspective, the number of conditions in rules is not im-
portant. What matters is the actual discriminatory power of the individual
conditions, which can vary substantially. However, following the application of
unit bias, people can view conditions as units of similar importance, disregarding
their sometimes vastly different discriminatory and predictive power.
Debiasing techniques. One of the common ways how regulators address un-
healthy food consumption patterns related to varying sizes of packaging is in-
troduction of mandatory labelling of the size and calorie contents. Following
an analogy to clearly communicating the size of food item, informing analysts
about the discriminatory power of the individual conditions may alleviate unit
bias. Such indicator can be generated automatically, for example, by listing the
number of instances in the entire dataset that meet the condition.
6. Recommendations for Rule Learning Algorithms and Software
This section provides a concise list of considerations that is aimed to raise
awareness among machine learning practitioners regarding the availability of
measures that could potentially suppress effect of cognitive biases on compre-
hension of rule-based models. We expect part of the list to be useful also for
other symbolic machine learning models, such as decision trees. In our recom-
mendations, we focus on systems that present the rule model to a human user,
which we refer to as the analyst. We consider two basic roles the analyst can
have in the process: approval of the complete classification model (”interpretable
classifiation task”), and selection of interesting rules (”nugget discovery”).
6.1. Representation of a rule
The interpretation of natural language expressions used to describe a rule
can lead to systematic distortions. Our review revealed the following recom-
mendations applicable to individual rules:
1. Syntactic elements. There are several cognitive studies indicating
that AND is often misunderstood [70], [59, p. 95-96]. The results of our
experiments [52] support the conclusion that AND needs to be presented
unambiguously in the rule learning context. Research has shown that
“and” ceases to be ambiguous when it is used to connect propositions
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rather than categories. Similarly, the communication of the implication
construct IF THEN connecting antecedent and consequent should be made
unambiguous.
Another important syntactic construct is negation (NOT). While process-
ing of negation has not been included among the surveyed biases, our
review of literature (cf. Section 7.5) suggests that its use should be dis-
couraged on the grounds that its processing requires more cognitive effort,
and because the fact that a specific information was negated may not be
remembered in the long term.
2. Conditions. Attribute-value pairs comprising conditions are typically
either formed of words with semantics meaningful to the user, or of codes
that are not directly meaningful. When conditions contain words with
negative valence, these need to be reviewed carefully, since negative infor-
mation is known to receive more attention and is associated with higher
weight than positive information. A number of biases can be triggered or
strengthened by the lack of understanding of attributes and their values
appearing in rules. Providing easily accessible information on conditions
in the rules, including their predictive power, can thus prove as an effective
debiasing technique.
People have the tendency to put higher emphasis on information they are
exposed to first. By ordering the conditions by strength, machine learning
software can conform to human conversational maxims. The output could
also visually delimit conditions in the rules based on their significance or
predictive stength.
3. Interestingness measures. The values of interestingness measures should
be communicated using numerical expressions. Alternate verbal expres-
sions, with wordings such as “strong relationship” replacing specific nu-
merical values, are discouraged because there is some evidence that such
verbal expressions are prone to miscommunication.
Currently, rule interest measures are typically represented as probabilities
(confidence) or ratios (lift), whereas results in cognitive science indicate
that natural frequencies are better understood.
The tendency of humans to ignore base rates and sample sizes (which
closely relate to rule support) is a well established fact in cognitive sci-
ence. Results of our experiments on inductively learned rules also provide
evidence for this conclusion [52]. Our proposition is that this effect can
be addressed by presenting confidence (reliability) intervals for the values
of measures of interest, where applicable.
6.2. Rule models
In many cases, rules are not presented in isolation to the analyst, but instead
within a collection of rules comprising a rule model. Here, we relate the results
of our review to the following aspects of rule models:
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4. Model size. An experiment by Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al. [124] found
that people are better able to simulate results of a larger regression model
composed of eight coefficients than of a smaller model composed of two
coefficients. The results indicate that removal of any unnecessary vari-
ables could improve model interpretability even though the experiment
did not find a difference in the trust in the model based on the number
of coefficients it consisted of. Similarly to regression models, rule models
often incorporate output that is considered as marginally relevant. This
can take a form of (nearly) redundant rules or (nearly) redundant condi-
tions in the rule. Our analysis shows that such redundancies can induce
a number of biases, which may be accountable for misintepretation of the
model. Size of a rule model can be reduced by utilizing various pruning
techniques, or by using learning algorithms that allow the user to set or
influence size of the resulting model. Examples of such approaches include
those proposed by Letham et al. [90], Lakkaraju et al. [87], Wang et al.
[160]. The Interpretable Decision Sets algorithm [87] can additionally op-
timize for diversity and non-overlap of discovered rules, directly countering
the reiteration effect.
Another potentially effective approach to discarding some rules can be us-
ing domain knowledge or constraints set by the user to remove the strong
(e.g., highly confident), yet “obvious” rules confirming common knowl-
edge.8 Removal of weak rules could help to address the tradeoff contrast
as well as the weak evidence effect.
5. Rule grouping. The rule learning literature has seen multiple attempts
to develop methods for grouping similar rules, often by clustering. Our
review suggests that presenting clusters of similar rules can help to reduce
cognitive biases caused by reiteration.
Algorithms that learn rule lists provide mandatory ordering of rules, while
the rule order in rule-set learning algorithms is not important. In either
case, the rule order as presented to the user will affect perception of the
model due to conversational maxims and the primacy effect. It is recom-
mended to sort the presented rules by strength. However, due to paucity of
applicable research, it is unclear which particular definition of rule strength
would lead to the best results in terms of bias mitigation.
6.3. User Engagement
Some results of our review suggest that increasing user interaction can help
counter some biases. Some specific suggestions for machine learning user inter-
faces (UIs) follow:
7. Domain knowledge. Selectively presenting domain knowledge “conflict-
ing” with the considered rule can help to invoke the ’consider-the-opposite’
8For example, it is well-known that diastolic blood pressure rises with body mass index
(DBP↑↑BMI). Rules confirming this relationship might be removed [83].
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debiasing strategy. Other research has shown that the plausibility of a
model depends on compliance to monotonicity constraints [46]. We thus
suggest that UIs make background information on discovered rules easily
accessible.
8. Eliciting rule annotation. Activating the deliberate “System 2” is one
of the most widely applicable debiasing strategies. One way to achieve
this is to require accountability, e.g., through visual interfaces motivating
users to annotate selected rules, which would induce the ’note taking’
debiasing strategy. Giving people additional time to consider the problem
has been in some cases shown as an effective debiasing strategy. This can
be achieved by making the selection process (at least) two stage, allowing
the user to revise the selected rules.
9. User search for rules rather than scroll. Repeating rules can affect
users via the mere exposure effect even if they are exposed to them even
for a short moment, e.g., when scrolling a rule list. The user interfaces
should thus deploy alternatives to scrolling in discovered rules, such as
search facilities.
6.4. Bias inoculation
In some studies, basic education about specific biases, such as brief tuto-
rials, decreased the fallacy rate. This debiasing strategy has been called bias
inoculation in the literature.
10. Education on specific biases. Several studies have shown that provid-
ing explicit guidance and education on formal logic, hypothesis testing,
and critical assessment of information can reduce fallacy rates in some
tasks. However, the effect of psychoeducational methods is still a subject
of dispute [92], and cannot be thus recommended as a sole or sufficient
measure.
7. Limitations and Future Work
Our goal was to examine whether cognitive biases can affect the interpre-
tation of machine learning models and to propose possible remedies if they do.
Since this field is untapped from the machine learning perspective, we tried to
approach the problem holistically. Our work yielded a number of partial contri-
butions, rather than a single profound result. We mapped applicable cognitive
biases, identified prior works on their suppression, and proposed how these could
be transferred to machine learning. In the following, we outline some promising
direction of future work.
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7.1. Validation through human-subject experiments
All the identified shortcomings of human judgment pertaining to the inter-
pretation of inductively learned rules are based on empirical cognitive science
research. For each cognitive bias, we provided a justification how it would re-
late to machine learning. Due to the absence of applicable prior research in the
intersection between cognitive science and machine learning, this justification is
mostly based on authors’ experience in machine learning.
A critical next step is empirical validation of the selected cognitive biases.
We have already described several user experiments aimed at validating se-
lected cognitive biases in Fu¨rnkranz et al. [52]. Some other machine learning
researchers have reported human-subject experiments that do not explicitly re-
fer to cognitive biases, yet the cognitive phenomena they investigate may cor-
respond to a known cognitive bias. One example is a study by Lage et al.
[86] (cf. also extended version in [106]), which investigated the effect of the
number of cognitive chunks (conditions) in a rule on response time. While the
main outcome confirms the intuition that higher complexity results in higher
response times, this study has also revealed several unexpected patterns, such
as that defining a new concept and reusing it leads to a higher response time
than repeating the description whenever that concept implicitly appears, even
though this repetition means that subjects have to read more lines. The findings
could possibly be attributed to fluency in judgement, a cognitive phenomenon
assumed to underlie multiple cognitive biases.
Despite the existence of several early studies, much more concentrated and
systematic effort is needed to yield insights on the size of effect individual biases
can have on understanding of machine learning models.
7.2. Role of Domain Knowledge
It has been long recognized that external knowledge plays an important rule
in the rule learning process. Already Mitchell [102] recognized at least two dis-
tinct roles external knowledge can play in machine learning: it can constrain
the search for appropriate generalizations, and guide learning based on the in-
tended use of the learned generalizations. Interaction with domain knowledge
has played an important role in multiple stages of the machine learning pro-
cess. For example, it can improve semi-supervised learning [23], and in some
applications it is vital to convert discovered rules back into domain knowledge
[50, p. 288]. Some results also confirm the common intuition that compliance
to constraints valid in the given domain increases the plausibility of the learned
models [46].
Our review shows that domain knowledge can be one of the important in-
struments in the toolbox aimed at debiasing interpretation of discovered rules.
To give a specific example, the presence or strength of the validity effect depends
on the familiarity of the subject with the topic area from which the information
originates [18]. Future work should focus on a systematic review of the role of
domain knowledge on activation or inhibition of cognitive phenomena applicable
to interpretability of rule learning results.
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7.3. Individual Differences
The presence of multiple cognitive biases and their strengths have been linked
to specific personality traits. For example, overconfidence and the rate of con-
junctive fallacy have been shown to be inversely related to numeracy [168].
According to Juslin et al. [77], the application of the averaging heuristic rather
than the normative multiplication of probabilities seems to depend on the work-
ing memory capacity and/or high motivation.
Some research can even be interpreted as indicating that data analysts can
be more susceptible to the myside bias than the general population. An ex-
periment reported by Wolfe and Britt [169] shows that subjects who defined
good arguments as those that can be proved by facts (this stance, we assume,
would also apply to many data analysts) were more prone to exhibiting the
myside bias.9 Stanovich et al. [141] show that the incidence of myside bias is
surprisingly not related to general intelligence. This suggests that even highly
intelligent analysts can be affected. Albarrac´ın and Mitchell [2] propose that the
susceptibility to the confirmation bias can depend on one’s personality traits.
They also present a diagnostic tool called “defense confidence scale” that can
identify individuals who are prone to confirmational strategies. Further research
into personality traits of users of machine learning outputs, as well as into devel-
opment of appropriate personality tests, would help to better target education
focused on debiasing.
7.4. Incorporating Additional Biases
There are about 24 cognitive biases covered in Cognitive Illusions, the au-
thoritative overview of cognitive biases by Pohl [122], and even 51 different biases
are covered by Evans et al. [37]. While doing the initial selection of cognitive
biases to study, we tried to identify those most relevant for machine learning
research matching our criteria. In the end, our review focused on a selection of
20 cognitive biases (effects, illusions). Future work might focus on expanding
the review with additional relevant biases, such as labelling and overshadowing
effects [122].
7.5. Extending Scope Beyond Biases
There is a number of cognitive phenomena affecting the interpretability of
rules, which are not classified as cognitive biases. Remarkably, since 1960 there
is a consistent line of work by psychologists studying cognitive processes related
to rule induction, which is centred around the so-called Wason’s 2-4-6 problem
[161]. Cognitive science research on rule induction in humans has so far not been
noticed in the rule learning subfield of machine learning.10 It was out of the
scope of the objectives of this review to conduct an analysis of the significance
9This tendency is explained by Wolfe and Britt [169] as follows: “For people with this belief,
facts and support are treated uncritically. . . .More importantly, arguments and information
that may support another side are not part of the schema and are also ignored.”
10Based on our analysis of cited reference search in Google Scholar for [161].
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of these results for rule learning, nevertheless we believe that such investigation
could bring interesting insights for cognitively-inspired design of rule learning
algorithms.
Another promising direction for further work is research focused on the in-
terpretation of negations (“not”). Experiments conducted by Jiang et al. [75]
show that the mental processes involved in processing negations slow down rea-
soning. Negation can be also sometimes ignored or forgotten [30], as it decreases
veracity of long-term correct remembrance of information.
Most rule learning algorithms are capable of generating rules containing
negated literals. For example, a healthy company can be represented as status
= not(bankrupt).
Our precautionary suggestion based on interpretation of results obtained in
general studies performed in experimental psychology [30] and neurolinguistics
[75] is that artificial learning systems should refrain, wherever feasible, from
the use of negation in the discovered rules that are to be presented to the
user. Due the adverse implications of the use of negation on cognitive load and
remembrance, empirical research focused interpretability of negation in machine
learning is urgently needed.
8. Conclusion
To our knowledge, cognitive biases have not yet been discussed in relation
to the interpretability of machine learning results. We thus initiated this review
of research published in cognitive science with the intent of providing a psy-
chological basis to further research in inductive rule learning algorithms, and
to the way their results are communicated. Our review covered twenty cogni-
tive biases, heuristics, and effects that can give rise to systematic errors when
inductively learned rules are interpreted.
For most biases and heuristics included in our review, psychologists have
proposed “debiasing” measures. Application of prior empirical results obtained
in cognitive science allowed us to propose several methods that could be effective
in suppressing these cognitive phenomena when machine learning models are
interpreted.
Overall, in our review, we processed only a fraction of potentially relevant
psychological studies of cognitive biases, but we were unable to locate a single
study focused on machine learning. Future research should thus focus on em-
pirical evaluation of effects of cognitive biases in the machine learning domain.
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